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Abstract 
 
 
In the United States, cancer remains one of the leading causes of death, as well as one of 
the most expensive conditions, across all medical domains. In efforts to address this public health 
concern, health systems are implementing new payment structures to improve quality and lower 
the cost for cancer services. The number of Value Based Programs (VBPs) and Alternative 
Payment Models (APM)s continue to grow, despite numerous challenges discussed in literature 
and industry. Under the umbrella of CMS, The Health Care Plan Learning Action Network 
(HCPLAN) regulates and measures the number of payer and provider contracts tied to various 
quality measures, but the question of whether or not APMs improve clinical value through a 
reduction of cost and improved patient outcomes remains unanswered. This paper explores the 
complexity of APM adoption within the realm of oncology and highlights additional challenges 
that health systems potentially face when considering payment implementation. The findings of 
the paper suggest that the need for clear definitions of cancer care, patient populations, strong 
data reporting capabilities, and scope of APM adoption are paramount before implementation.   
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1.0 Introduction 
The United States healthcare system is widely accepted as a complex arrangement of 
organizations and agencies that operate amid an increasingly uncertain regulatory landscape. In 
recent years, much of the focus has been centered on the Federal Government’s role in healthcare 
payment reform. Traditionally, payers and providers operate in a fee-for-service (FFS) 
environment, in which payers reimburse providers for rendered health serves, based on 
contractually agreed upon rates. The common critique of the FFS payment model is that it 
incentivizes providers to maximize the number of health services rendered in efforts to increase 
reimbursements, which ultimately increases cost. Health policy makers argue that a shift towards 
value-based payment (VBP) will reverse quantity driven incentives by reimbursing providers 
based on the value of delivered care. They also argue that the move to VBP will decrease health 
expenditures and improve overall patient outcomes on the macro-level (CMS, 2020). In essence, 
this payment reform places supplemental financial risk onto provider systems, theoretically 
encouraging them to limit unnecessary care and improve quality. Another rationale for payment 
reform is the overall rise in healthcare expenditures, which grew 4.6% in 2018 and represented 
17.7% of the nation’s total Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) also reports that national health spending is projected to grow at an 
average annual rate of 5.5% across the next decade, projecting heath expenditures as a share of 
GDP to reach 19.4% by 2027 (National Health Expenditure (NHE) Fact Sheet, 2020). This national 
discussion and continued increase in healthcare costs has resulted in creation of VBP and 
Alternative Payment Models (APM) through CMS. Regulators, payers and providers work 
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together to construct APMs for a given population or a specific clinical condition, in order to 
appropriately measure cost and quality outcomes and reimburse providers accordingly.  
In 2015, The Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA) was signed into 
law creating the Quality Payment Program, which includes the Merit-Based Incentive Payment 
System (MIPS) and APMs (MACRA, 2020). The overarching goals of these VBPs are to fulfill 
the “Triple Aim”, which strives to simultaneously improve individual care, maximize patient 
population health outcomes and reduce cost (IHI, 2020). In the same year, The U.S. Department 
of Health & Human Services (HHS) announced a goal of tying 30% of all FFS Medicare Payments 
to quality or value through APMs by 2016 and 50% by 2018. Also in 2015, CMS established the 
Health Care Payment Learning & Action Network (HCPLAN) in efforts to achieve these goals by 
influencing payers and providers to adopt APMs and other VBP approaches, across both the public 
and private sectors (HCPLAN, 2019). Although VBP legislation has been passed and APMs have 
been implemented across some areas of the healthcare ecosystem, literature shows numerous 
issues in their application. Some of the problems include the difficulty in defining quality, 
calculating clinical value as it relates to cost, and addressing the nuance of a single clinical domain. 
In the realm of VBP, the terms quality and value are often used synonymously across the industry. 
However, when describing APM adoption, it’s critical to present the clear distinctions between 
quality and value. In this context, quality refers to patient outcome metrics and the ability to 
measure provider performance, strictly from a clinical standpoint. Value is a broader term that 
takes both patient outcome metrics and the cost of services into consideration when measuring 
overall provider performance. Therefore, providers that are able to deliver services that improve 
patient outcomes at lower than expected cost are maximizing the overall value of care. Achieving 
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definition alignment and APM implementation is a large obstacle for payer and providers, 
especially when considering the nuance at the clinical-level.       
This paper considers oncology and discusses the scale of its diagnosis and treatment 
complexity, in addition to the impact this branch of medicine has on overall health expenditures. 
The paper also explores the impact cancer management has on provider billing and reimbursement. 
Specifically, it focuses on the implications of APMs in oncology by highlighting some of the major 
challenges payers and providers encounter when implementing these complex payment models 
into their systems. It argues that the sheer level of nuance across the healthcare landscape requires 
an unprecedented amount of standardization across a single service line, in order to achieve the 
desired goals of low costs and improved health outcomes. First, the paper looks to build off of the 
current APM frameworks and offer new perspectives when considering oncology payment reform. 
The second aim is to highlight the difficulty of APM implementation broadly by exploring the 
barriers payers and providers encounter when adopting new payment models for other medical 
domains in the future state. 
1.1 HCPLAN 
In 2019, HCPLAN released its results from 2018 APM Measurement Effort, along with a 
new set of payment goals and an updated APM framework. The new definition of APM contracts 
are ones that contain two-sided risk (Categories 3B, 4A, 4B, & 4C of the framework). The new 
goals outline the percentage of payments tied to two-sided risk and are shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1. HCPLAN APM Framework 
HCPLAN APM Framework 
Description 
Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4 
FFS - No Link to 
Quality & Value 
FFS - Link to 
Quality & Value 
APMs Built on 
FFS Architecture 
Population Based 
Payment 
A - 
Foundational 
Payments for 
Infrastructure & 
Operations 
APMs with 
Shared Savings 
Condition Specific-
Population Based 
Payment (e.g. 
payments for 
specialty services, 
such as oncology or 
mental health) 
B - Pay for Reporting 
APMs with 
Shared Savings & 
Downside Risk 
Comprehensive 
Population-Based 
Payment 
C - 
Pay-for-
Performance 
- 
Integrated Finance 
& Delivery System 
 
In terms of the 2018 results, HCPLAN gathered data from 62 health plans and seven State 
Medicaid programs, which represents approximately 77% of the total US insured population 
(HCPLAN Press Release, 2019). The results are listed in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. HCPLAN Payment Goals 
HCPLAN Payment Goals 
Line of Business By 2020 By 2022 By 2023 
Medicare 30% 50% 100% 
Medicaid 15% 25% 50% 
Commercial 15% 25% 50% 
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A brief summary of the results indicate that the goals of APM adoption set by HCPLAN 
should be attainable, given the number of APM contracts in 2018. However, there are notable 
limitations in the HCPLAN measurement efforts, some of which were highlighted in their report. 
These include the fact that only 77% of the covered lives were represented in the measurement, as 
not every payer or state participated. There is also the issue of varying interpretation of APM 
categories and metrics across the payers, as well as data and reporting challenges (HCPLAN, 
2019).  
The limitations in the report that were not mentioned, point to both overarching 
measurement problems as well as highly nuanced problems that have potential measurement 
implications on the macro-level. With respect to the overall measurement problem itself, the report 
does not discuss the connection between health utilization and expenditures as they relate to APMs. 
Although the percentage of APM contract adoption by line of business is known, the HCPLAN 
does not compare how utilization rates and the total cost of care relate to these contracts. This also 
holds true for outcomes and population health measurements, as it is currently unknown if an 
increase in APMs has a positive impact on overall patient outcomes. Further, the measurement 
methodology does not address the gamut of healthcare delivery, which is significant given the vast 
range of different types of clinical services. Moreover, each clinical area itself contains a wide 
array different therapeutic areas and unique patient populations. This aspect, combined with the 
fact that patients have highly complex treatment plans, different payer coverage, and unique 
providers, demonstrates added layers of measurement problems. It is therefore a prerequisite to 
standardize definitions of quality to this detail in order to accommodate clinical and operational 
nuance and ensure successful APM measurement. These considerations raise additional concerns 
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pertaining to the limitations of the HCPLAN APM measurement methodology, as well as the HHS 
Triple Aim.  
The framework lists Oncology under Category 4A, as condition-specific or population-
based payment. This paper looks to expand on these measurement limitations in the application of 
APMs across this broad medical domain by emphasizing the number of obstacles payers and 
providers confront during APM oncology implementation from an operational standpoint.   
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2.0 Oncology Overview 
Oncology is the field of medicine that prevents, diagnoses, and treats tumor and cancer 
illnesses. The fact that cancer is not a disease, but rather a collection of related diseases is not 
trivial because it describes the outermost layer of complexity when considering diagnostic and 
treatment modalities. There are over 100 different types of cancer, each of which have unique 
subtypes of cancer, properties in formation, disease progression, and treatment options, among 
other exclusive components (National Cancer Institute, 2020). For example, Leukemia is a specific 
type of cancer, yet remains a categorical term to describe cancer in blood cells and has four major 
types, including Acute Lymphocytic Leukemia, Acute Myelogenous Leukemia, Chronic 
Lymphocytic Leukemia, and Chronic Myelogenous Leukemia. Each of these types of Leukemia 
have unique patient populations, disease progression and severity, and treatment options (National 
Cancer Institute Leukemia, 2020). To add onto this complexity, it’s important to note that cancers 
have unique combinations of genetic alterations, meaning nearly every individual is impacted 
differently, even if they have the same cancer type (National Cancer Institute, 2020). Staging is 
another cornerstone in cancer treatment, which is used to determine the extent of the disease 
progression. The majority of cancers have four stages, with the fourth stage representing the most 
advanced and severe disease progression. This concept is relevant because the staging serves as 
the foundation for all aspects of cancer diagnosis and treatment (Brierley, J., et. Al., 2016). The 
staging aspect at the individual patient-level also corresponds to the large number of intricacies 
that can arise during cancer management, consequently leading to potential issues in claims billing 
and reimbursement. It’s also important to note that provider billing systems often lack the capacity 
to capture detailed cancer staging information, which is used for important clinical decisions and 
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recommendations. The inability to capture cancer diagnosis information to this depth causes 
further complications from a systems perspective. Specifically, the failure to account for different 
cancer disease stages and prognoses will have serious ramifications to payer risk adjustment and 
reimbursement. Cancer patients in advanced stages of the disease will maintain greater risk from 
a utilization, cost and outcome perspective, compared to their early stage counterparts. Payers and 
providers must overcome these barriers as regulation for APM adoption in oncology expands its 
footprint. This means health systems need to consider oncology outcomes and expenditures on the 
macro-level, in addition to understanding the multifaceted treatment problems clinically, in order 
to adequately construct APMs for cancer services.  
2.1 Oncology Outcomes 
Disease consequences in cancer care remain in a complicated state, as cancer prevalence 
has declined and overall costs have increased. The number of cancer survivors in the US is 
expected to increase to 19 million by 2024. However, over the past decade the cancer mortality 
rates have been declining an average of 1.5% annually. The cancer incidence rates have also 
declined 0.7% annually over the past decade (American Society of Clinical Oncology, 2016). 
These positives are often attributed to expanded treatment options for patients, improved therapies 
and prevention efforts made by numerous stakeholders in the cancer community. In general, 
oncology outcomes are favorable; however, they are met with an increased number of treatment 
models and rapidly growing expenditures. The rising complexity and cost have added pressures 
for payers, health systems, clinicians and researchers to develop new strategies for delivering high 
quality oncology care. Regulatory uncertainty and payment reform have supplemented these 
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pressures. The new oncology APM and care delivery models are challenged with navigating this 
dynamic regulatory environment, while optimizing payment and care initiatives to account for the 
different types of cancer, disease progression, and complicated treatment plans (American Society 
of Clinical Oncology, 2016). Payers and providers are also tasked with aligning definitions and 
identifying tangible quality metrics, so that cancer patient outcomes can be measured. Finally, 
these systems must have the capabilities to juxtapose these qualities metrics with relevant cancer 
service costs, in order to reimburse providers based on the value of care delivered. Similar to other 
areas of medicine, isolating the primary cost drivers at the clinical-level is incredibly difficult given 
the number of different treatment types. However, recognizing expenditures at the macro-level 
helps shed light onto the areas of cancer with the greatest prevalence, as well as the most expensive 
treatment areas. This has the potential to help payers and providers identify the biggest areas of 
opportunity in terms of cost reduction and quality improvement in the cancer domain.   
2.2 Oncology Treatment Complexity 
There are numerous difficulties that occur in the cancer treatment process that range from 
problems with accurate diagnoses to metastasis treatments, towards the end stages of the disease 
progression (Chakraborty, S., et. Al., 2012). Due to the highly complex nature of tumor 
development, treatment strategies that target single molecular abnormalities and specific clinical 
pathways has led to positive clinical responses. The ability for researchers and clinicians to develop 
predictive markers for immunotherapy and immune-oncology has helped clinicians determine 
appropriate treatment benefits for patients with complex cancers. However, there have also been 
major challenges addressing the multifaceted approaches to cancer treatment, as it’s clear that 
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targeting singular clinical pathways is insufficient comprehensive treatment. The literature 
suggests that multiple drug combinations against several alterations of cancer indicators will likely 
be an effective strategy in cancer treatment. Researchers also indicate that personalized 
combination strategies to treat individual patients’ tumor biology will be at the forefront of future 
cancer treatment challenges (Zugazagoitia, J., et. Al., 2016). Supplemental research pertaining to 
individualized cancer treatment points to the level of variability within each tumor and the 
necessary cancer drug treatments to combat this issue of specialized cancer growth. Specifically, 
researchers highlight evidence that cancer drugs are constantly evolving and the expectations for 
cancer drug innovation to continue, in order to continue the progression towards better treatment 
and patient outcomes (Falzone, L., et. Al., 2018). Cancer patients suffering from additional 
illnesses also adds to treatment complexity because clinicians must account for more 
individualized cancer management plans. The prevalence of these comorbidities can have 
substantial impacts on therapeutic options for clinicians, especially if the comorbidity outweighs 
the cancer in severity (Fowler, H., et. Al, 2020).   
2.3 Oncology Expenditures 
The National Cancer Institute projects the total cost of cancer to reach $173 billion by 
2020, attributing to a 2% increase in costs annually and a 39% increase from 2010. This represents 
approximately 5% of the total U.S. health expenditures annually (National Cancer Institute Cancer 
Prevalence and Cost of Care Projections, 2020). The top cancer disease types by cost are breast, 
colorectal, lymphoma, lung, and prostate, which make up roughly 50% of the total cost of all 
cancer treatments (Yabroff, K., et. Al., 2011). In terms of breaking down the total cancer cost 
 11 
expenditure by medical services (i.e. hospitalizations, surgical procedures, radiation therapy and 
chemotherapy), there is difficulty in determining the share of cost among different treatments. This 
is due to a multitude of factors, including the issue of disparities in cancer treatment costs across 
multiple facilities, as well as the lack of total cost of cancer care data within payer and provider 
systems. Cancer centers often struggle to determine how much of their patients’ care is delivered 
at different facilities, thus impeding the ability for payers and providers to identify large savings 
opportunities (Adelson, K., et. Al., 2016). Further complications in identifying cancer treatment 
cost data is potentially due to the aforementioned complexity in diagnoses and treatment. Despite 
these issues, data on cancer drug expenditures is more accessible, as oncology medication is a 
more easily defined treatment modality. The total cost of oncology medication is estimated at $57 
billion and has grown 64% over the past five years. Cancer drugs therefore represent 
approximately 33% of total cancer expenditures annually, 2019). By scaling the overall cancer 
expenditures health systems can gain a better understanding of the primary cost drivers and 
potential areas of savings opportunities. This could be a critical component of future APM 
development and implementation in oncology. However, total cancer cost data at the clinical-level 
is necessary for APM construction. Given the number of cost data issues surrounding most cancer 
modalities, cancer drug treatment is a primary candidate for foundational APM construction.  
2.4 Oncology Payment Decisions 
The level of nuance across this medical domain from a treatment perspective holds the 
potential to create operational problems from a billing or reimbursement standpoint. With the 
understanding that cancer treatment is incredibly individualized, developers of payment models 
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must account for this level of complexity when determining appropriate reimbursement rates for 
cancer care delivery, even in a traditional FFS environment. It is therefore likely that the move 
towards VBP potentially exacerbates these payment complications. It is critical for health systems 
to not only recognize the industry trend towards APM adoption, but also the various elements of 
program design that exist across the landscape. Some of the primary aspects of a VBP include the 
scope of measurement, performance target setting, and payment reward incentives. The decision 
to broaden or narrow the scope of an APM can dictate which measures health systems will be 
evaluated on, whether it is cost, quality or both. Further, broad APM scopes can be designed to 
measure quality across multiple clinical areas, although this may intensify operational burdens. 
The second decision pertains to the development of performance targets. Payers hold the option to 
set absolute or relative performance targets to participating providers depending on the available 
benchmarks and data reporting capabilities (Maddox, K., et. Al., 2017). Absolute targets set 
specific quality objectives for clinicians to meet, while relative targets consider industry 
benchmarks. Due to the recent inception of APMs, the required data to set benchmarks is scarce, 
leading researchers to suggest that relative performance targets are more easily implemented 
(Maddox, K., et. Al., 2017). The final major considerations of APM design are the payment reward 
incentives, which include achievement and improvement decisions. Payment that rewards 
achievement focused solely on the outcomes of the quality performance, while improvement 
payment can reward favorable clinical quality trends. Further, payers can hold the option to 
implement bonuses and penalties as they connect to payment incentives (Maddox, K., et. Al., 
2017).   
Additional considerations to APM adoption in oncology involve the review of broad APM 
adoption and the relevant terminology. It is potentially beneficial for health systems to review the 
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different types VBPs and APMs, along with their corresponding outcomes following adoption in 
other systems. It is also critical for health systems to examine the results of APM adoption in the 
realm of oncology to help gauge the successes and failures of different decisions made in the past 
and in the current state.   
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3.0 VBP in the Current State 
From a regulatory lens, the growing emphasis on VBP has prompted the development of 
Medicare value payment models in particular. The five original CMS VBPs are the Hospital 
Readmission Reduction Program (HRRP), Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program (HVBP), 
Hospital-Acquired Conditions Reduction Program (HACRP), Medicare Shared Savings program 
(MSSP), and the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS). There are also a number of 
specialty VBP programs, such as programs for skilled nursing facilities and home health facilities. 
Under CMS, the aforementioned MIPS program run in tandem with APM programs and are 
designed to achieve objectives aligned with the Triple Aim (MACRA, 2020). With respect to 
value-based payment in oncology, the APM programs most closely align with this clinical domain 
given the HCPLAN framework. However, in addition to APM development, it is necessary for 
payers and providers to examine other aspects of VBP frameworks, such as bundled payments and 
Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs). These areas within the realm of VBP could be essential 
for health organizations preparing for alternative payment methods in oncology.  
3.1 Bundled Payments 
With the overall focus on value-based payment and the acceleration of APMs in the 
healthcare landscape, the number of bundled payment programs has also increased. Most bundled 
payment models are defined as a single payment for healthcare services tied to a specific condition 
or procedure for a specified time period. In order for payers to facilitate these types of payments, 
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the bundle must focus on a patient’s entire episode-of-care. Another objective of bundled payments 
is to hold hospitals accountable for managing episode-based Medicare spending and promote care 
coordination across their services (Scott, B., et. Al., 2016). In 2011, The Center for Medicare and 
Medicaid Innovation (CMMI) introduced episode-based bundled payment programs in Medicare. 
CMMI’s key initiative was the Bundled Payments for Care Improvement (BPCI) initiative. Many 
payers and providers have established bundled payments for particular services as an alternative 
to comprehensive APMs, which often have more complex designs. The BPCI was also a voluntary 
program that payers and providers could choose to opt into for Medicare reimbursement redesign 
(CMS BPCI, 2020). Outside of Medicare, commercial payers and other employer groups have also 
designed similar types of bundled payment models. Regardless of the line of business, the aim of 
the bundle remains, which is to improve quality of patient care and reduce cost, while 
simultaneously improving health outcomes. Further, if the desired quality or cost outcomes are not 
achieved, payers can hold providers accountable, which is likely why payers in other lines of 
business have found these models attractive. However, this provider accountability aspect can also 
be separated in two different forms that involve upside and downside risk in regards to their payer 
contracts. In downside risk models, providers must refund payers if the total cost of care within a 
given bundle exceeds the outlined financial benchmarks. Upside risk models enable payers and 
providers to share in the savings from a particular episode-based bundled service, thus alleviating 
some of the payment pressure for providers (CMS BCPI, 2020).  
While the majority of bundled payment programs have been designed voluntarily and 
guided by BPCI, CMS has recently taken steps towards mandatory bundled payment programs for 
particular services. In 2015, CMS announced a mandatory bundled payment program for total hip 
and knee replacements for Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement (CJR). CMS also proposed 
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new mandatory bundled payments for cardiac care. The CJR and cardiac bundled payment 
programs also present both upside and downside risks to payers and providers and hold similar 
models to their voluntary predecessors. However, there are significant differences between 
voluntary and mandated bundled payment programs that may have serious impacts on payer and 
provider performance. Under the mandated programs, providers do not have the leverage to opt 
out of the programs without receiving federal penalties. They also do not have input when 
establishing the duration or definitions for episodes-of-care (CMS BCPI, 2020). This component, 
in addition to the likelihood of constantly changing performance metrics, presents more challenges 
for payers and providers to navigate in a bundled care or APM environment.  
In terms of performance of bundled payments, there has been limited research in examining 
its efficacy, especially in terms of measuring patient outcomes. Research also has yet to determine 
the unintended consequences of bundled payments. These ramifications could revolve around 
providers intentionally selecting a particular set of healthier patients with relatively less complex 
treatment plans, in order to increase the likelihood of reduced costs and favorable health outcomes. 
Other limitations in bundled payments mimic the issues described in APM adoption overall, which 
include definition discrepancies, data issues, and measurement difficulties (Joynt, K., et. Al., 2018) 
With respect to oncology services, literature also suggests that future bundled payments will focus 
on drug costs, despite the fact that Medicare Part D is currently not included in the CMS bundled 
care programs (Scott, B. et. Al., 2016). Although CMS currently does not mandate APMs within 
oncology specifically, health systems could see a rise in bundled payment regulations for this 
conditions, given that mandates across other clinical service areas remains a possibility.     
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3.2 Accountable Care Organizations 
Under CMS, the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) encourages payers and 
providers to establish an Accountable Care Organization (ACO) in order to incentivize both 
systems to reduce cost and improve quality of care. MSSP is a voluntary program that offers 
multiple tracks to enable payers and providers to assume different levels of risk, based system 
capabilities and the patient populations (CMS Shared Savings Program, 2020). The performance 
of ACOs, as they pertain to reductions in cost and improve health outcomes is an area that requires 
further research. Shared Savings Programs and ACO studies have found low clinician engagement 
in terms of awareness and implementation of new treatment and payment changes. The 
determination of whether ACOs contribute positively to reductions in cost and improvements in 
care is still largely unknown. Reasons for the limitations of measuring ACO performance could be 
connected to the voluntary aspect of their structures. Additionally, ACOs could be experiencing 
similar issues to bundled payment programs and overall APMs with respect to data, definition, and 
measurement problems (Markovitz, A. et. Al., 2019). 
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4.0 APMs in Oncology 
Analogous to the emergence of APMs on the macro-level, an emphasis on optimizing VBP 
in the cancer service space has also amplified due to the growth in oncology expenditures. Despite 
this overall industry trend and added focus to oncology VBP across major stakeholders, the 
majority of ACOs and federal bundled payment initiatives have excluded cancer services. This is 
evident in the relatively low number of APM initiatives that pertain to oncology services in the 
current literature. Further, the APM initiatives that have been applied to oncology have a 
considerable number of drawbacks to these payment interventions with respect to measurement 
feasibility and standardization. Comprehensive studies pertaining to the implementation of 
oncology APMs have identified multiple bundled payment programs, ACOs, and Oncology 
Patient Centered Medical Homes (PCMHs) in practice. The research indicates that the majority of 
these oncology AMP reported costs, but failed to report quality or patient outcome data (Aviki, E., 
et. Al., 2018). With the inability to measure outcomes, there are axiomatic problems in evaluation 
of oncology APM efficacy. The reasons for these persistent limitations can be attributed to metric 
issues, arbitrary definitions for value, and a misalignment of key stakeholder interests, among other 
complications. In the current state, comprehensive study designs for assessing oncology related 
APM interventions to evaluate their impact on value-based care are not available. Despite, the lack 
of evidence for oncology APM success rates, there continues to be a growth in the number of 
APMs in cancer care.  
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4.1 Oncology APM Calculators 
Key stakeholders in the oncology community have developed value-based calculators in 
efforts to set the initial stage for evaluating value and cost for cancer services. Studies have 
highlighted the four major calculators used in value – based cancer care, which include American 
Society of Clinical Oncology (ASCO) Value Framework, The National Comprehensive Cancer 
Network Evidence Blocks (NCCN), DrugAbacus Calculator, and the Incremental Cost-
Effectiveness Ratio Calculator (ICER). The value calculators themselves are insufficient for 
industry because they lack the ability to translate a qualitative clinical outcome into a quantitative 
formula for calculating value. However, they serve as important steps for facilitating discussion 
on cost and value as they pertain to cancer services. Another important note is that these calculators 
are only applied to the costs and treatments of specialty cancer drugs and do not address other 
modalities in cancer treatment. In regards to the value calculators themselves, they each hold 
advantages and disadvantages that can serve as a platform for future discussion in oncology APM. 
The ASCO Value Framework establishes explicit definitions of value between patients and 
providers, with the intention being the definition will align across payers as well. This is a critical 
component of APM discussions, as the definition of quality and favorable patient outcomes is a 
widely disputed topic.  
ASCO defines value as the effectiveness or clinical benefit, safety, and efficiency of a drug 
treatment. ASCO compiles these three metrics in an aggregated metric known as the Net Health 
Benefit (NHB). The NHB is defined as the difference between the mean effectiveness of a new 
treatment and a known standard treatment. If the NHB delivers a mean effectiveness score above 
the standard treatment, then the new drug will be considered higher quality. This explicit definition 
of quality is the inherent advantage of the ASCO Value Framework; however, there are major 
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drawbacks with respect to cost. ASCO does not define cost in its NHB calculation, which is an 
evident issue when establishing definitions needed for APM adoption.  
The NCCN also has advantages in overcoming the quality definition issue. NCCN 
accomplishes this by the development of evidence blocks comprised five different value measures 
including toxicity/safety, efficacy, quality of evidence, consistency of evidence and affordability. 
All of these measures have been integrated for 28 tumor types. The value itself is calculated by 
NCCN panel members for a given tumor type, who score each measure on a one-to-five scale. 
Panel members utilize their clinical experience, along with published data for specific patient 
population types to determine the score for each measure and higher values indicate overall higher 
drug treatment quality. Similar to the ASCO Value Framework, the main disadvantage in the 
NCCN framework is the cost component of the calculation. The evidence blocks do not clearly 
define cost and the notion of affordability is highly subjective, as there are multiple panel members 
with varying definitions of cost effectiveness. This can ultimately lead to arbitrary definitions of 
affordability. Further, the majority of panel members are comprised of academics and the literature 
suggests this is another potential drawback, given clinical observations in the real-world may 
greatly differ from observations in clinical research. Reasons for this are likely due to the vast 
difference in cancer patient populations in research settings (such as those undergoing clinical 
trials), compared to overall cancer populations.  
The DrugAbacus framework uses calculators that include clinical toxicities and is able to 
contrast drug value and costs; however, this method is only used for research purposes and has not 
been implemented for clinical purposes. Finally, ICER defines the quality and cost of cancer drugs 
by the difference in cost between two possible drug interventions divided by the difference in their 
effect. This final result helps represent the average incremental cost associated with a drug 
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intervention and is widely considered as highly advantageous when considering cancer drug costs 
and quality simultaneously. When reviewing the constraints, ICER tells the same story as the other 
calculators and falls short when defining an appropriate cost (Nabhan, C., et. Al., 2017).  
Overall, value – based calculators are pivotal in initial discussions across APM adoption 
because they offer methodologies to help define quality of care. Their frameworks consider 
outcomes at the clinician-patient level and are able to account for the vast treatment complexity 
across the oncology spectrum. However, it is likely for this very reason that they fall short when 
assimilating cost calculators. While accounting for this complexity to calculate clinical value, they 
are unable to assign the corresponding services into a mathematical formula to calculate cost 
simultaneously. Payers and providers require calculators for both quality and cost, in order to 
quantify value. Moreover, the calculators assume all important clinical data is accessible to both 
the payers and providers, which is fallacious in industry, especially when these two parties have 
conflicting priorities and incentives. The cost at the patient level also brings out a plethora of other 
complexities, including the different types insurance coverage, income disparities, and different 
provider preferences.  
4.2 Oncology APM Initiatives 
The literature indicates that the majority of APM initiatives that have been applied to 
cancer services fall into the major categories of bundled payment models, ACOs, PCMHs, or a 
combination of other integrated care models. These initiatives have been implemented in both the 
public space through Medicare and through multiple payers in the private sector, though there are 
important distinctions and practical implications across each of the APMs (Robinson, 2017).  
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4.3 Medicare Oncology APM Initiative 
In the public sector, The CMS Innovation Center developed a 5-year Oncology Care Model 
(OCM) with objectives to improve care coordination, advance quality, and reduce cost for cancer 
services, specifically chemotherapy administration. The OCM incentivizes payer and providers to 
partner to join the initiative by offering performance – based bonus payments for improvements 
in efficiency (cost reduction) and quality. The OCM also includes a dual payment system for 
participating providers currently rendering services for chemotherapy treatment for a given cancer 
diagnosis. The first payment incorporates a Monthly Enhanced Oncology Services (MEOS) 
payment for the duration of the episode. The second payment is a potential performance-based 
payment and serves as the previously mentioned bonus. Specifically, these payments are 
administered by offering practices a $160 per-patient-per-month (PMPM) for an oncology practice 
when patients begin their cancer drug therapies (CMS Oncology Care Model, 2020). The definition 
of an episode, defined by the OCM, is one that covers nearly all cancer types, presumably 
regardless of stage of the disease. Further, patient episodes are set to terminate after undergoing 
six months of chemotherapy. Patients receiving chemotherapy after six months will activate 
another six-month sequence of episode payments. In order to qualify for the initiative, oncology 
practices must demonstrate data-based quality measurement capabilities, in addition to the 
development of an individualized care management plan for each patient, designed to assist in 
navigating the complex array of cancer services (CMS Oncology Care Model, 2020). Although 
the OCM provides payment incentives for adoption, some of the underlying components of the 
OCM could have potential ramifications for providers. The OCM calculations for expenditure 
targets include all oncology related services (radiology, drugs, surgery, hospital admissions). 
Further, they include nononcologic related clinical services to patients with cancer (CMS Fact 
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Sheet, 2020). This is a serious implication for practices that provide oncology services to older 
patient populations and patients with comorbidities, especially when considering the spending 
targets do not adjust for disease severity. Another important element in the OCM is the oncology 
practices’ exposure to risk with respect to drug spending, as the Medicare initiative includes drug 
spending in its targeted expenditures calculations. When drug spending is included in the 
performance initiative, alongside the other costs of care, it generates the risk of misaligned 
incentives from a pharmaceutical innovation standpoint. The innovation in oncological medication 
is a significant component for cancer care, especially in terms of improving patient outcomes. 
Research also points to the notion that an inclusion of drug spending in overall spending targets 
exposes practices to the risk of attaining high risk patients requiring more expensive cancer 
medications (Robinson, 2017).    
4.4 Private Payer Oncology APM Initiatives 
Similar to the Medicare APM initiative, private payers are also interested in implementing 
oncology payment mechanisms to reduce cost and improve overall patient outcomes. Recent 
studies highlight the comparison of oncology APM initiatives, across the major private payers in 
the U.S., namely Anthem, Aetna, and UnitedHealthcare. One aspect of these private payer 
initiatives that align with the OCM is the FFS component of oncology services. In the current state 
of cancer payment, both public and private payers reimburse providers on a FFS basis that include 
most oncology services, patient visits, chemotherapy, oncology drugs, and services that fall outside 
of patient visits and may not be directly connected to cancer services. Although there have been 
numerous policy proposals to remove FFS in place of APMs for cancer services, the status quo 
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has remained, which means that these initiatives have been applied to supplement FFS in oncology 
(Robinson, 2017). With respect to the HCPLAN measurement methodology, it is currently 
unknown if APM contracts built alongside FFS payment schedule are counted the same as APMs 
substituted for FFS entirely. The former is evidently the case in the oncology APM area and the 
implications of measurement and efficacy has also not been established. 
4.5 Anthem APM Initiative 
Anthem developed the Cancer Care Quality Program and is comparable to the OCM in that 
incorporates monthly payments to participating practices. These monthly payments are set at $350 
for each Anthem member utilizing chemotherapy services. The monthly payment begins and ends 
alongside the chemotherapy treatment itself.  Anthem incentivizes providers to join the initiative 
through these monthly performance payments, but requires practices to register their cancer 
patients to their Anthem cancer database. Oncology practices must also adhere to Anthem-
approved pathways in its selection across the different cancer treatments. These two requirements 
enable Anthem to gather clinical data, particularly type of cancer, stage of the disease, and key test 
results, in order to make important decisions from data not previously available in their claims 
systems (Robinson, 2017). The Anthem initiative strives towards reducing high cost cancer 
treatments, while rewarding oncology practices for favorable patient outcomes. However, there 
are potential drawbacks from a physician autonomy perspective, as oncologists would have certain 
limits on their treatment modalities.  
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4.6 Aetna APM Initiative 
Aetna launched its Oncology Solutions initiative, which also rewards providers by offering 
bonus payments to oncology practices that successfully managed costs. A key difference in the 
Aetna initiative is that it does not provide monthly payments to practices, as OCM and the Anthem 
initiative incorporated. Rather this new payment model is design to increase the markup applied 
to generic chemotherapies administered at the practice. This design adds to the facility revenues 
and is built to reduce the incentive for practices to prescribe expensive branded cancer drugs. 
Qualifying practices must have the capabilities to handle complicated claims and clinical data, in 
addition to the ability to follow to clinical pathways. Aetna’s initiative explicitly states that 
practices cannot merely rely on NCCN’s drug guidelines when developing their clinical pathways, 
as these guidelines do not consider costs (Robinson, 2017). This initiative’s potential 
disadvantages run parallel with Anthem’s with respect to physician autonomy. Although 
qualifying practices receive additional revenue, from a clinical standpoint the initiative poses 
potential restrictions on the number of available treatment options.  
4.7 UnitedHealthcare APM Initiative 
The UnitedHealthcare APM initiative is unique in that it offers lump-sum payments to 
qualified oncology practices. These payments are based on historic revenues earned by providers 
from billing office-infused oncology medications. UnitedHealthcare calculates the average sales 
price of these drugs and reimburses providers based on the revenues they would have made from 
drug markups. The design is built to avoid the need to prescribe high cost oncology drugs. Also 
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unique in this initiative, UnitedHealthcare was able to provide results from the APM intervention. 
Oncology practices experienced a decrease in overall expenditures and an increase in revenue; 
however, the drug costs increased (Robinson, 2017). Interestingly, these results run counter to the 
original expectations of the UnitedHealthcare initiative, as the aim was driven primarily at 
reducing high drug costs.   
4.8 APM Initiative Summary 
In contrast to the OCM, each private payer initiative does not include drug costs when 
calculating total cancer expenditures to avoid stifling pharmaceutical innovation and exposing 
oncology practices to these critical risks of combining these costs. Medicare includes drug 
spending in its costs targets, thus exposing oncology practices to greater financial risks. Medicare 
has also acknowledged these risks and has attempted to compensate by adding adjustable spending 
targets to account for newly approved oncology medications. This is in efforts to alleviate the 
financial risk, but places more restrictions on oncology payment adjustments overall (Robinson, 
2017).  
In summary, all of the oncology APM initiatives build off of FFS models, which is a unique 
structure compared to the majority of APMs that replace FFS entirely. Additionally, it’s important 
to note that all four initiatives avoided bundling payments when designing the payment models. 
There is also a potentially important distinction between bundled payments and episode–based 
payments as they pertain to APM development across the healthcare landscape, especially as many 
sources consider these terms synonymous. The former is the traditional APM structure that builds 
off of the BCPI and the mandatory bundled payment programs, while the latter allows health 
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systems the flexibility to define the specific clinical pathways. In bundled payments that include 
episode-based payment definitions, there is a clear beginning and end to treatment. These programs 
have shown most effective when the course of treatment has clearly defined timelines and the 
episode-of-care is easily mapped out. The nature of cancer and oncology services leads to 
unpredictable treatments, subsequently preventing definitive timelines. Studies point to the fact 
that the episodes-of-care in oncology often change unpredictably, with the key drivers of change 
through pharmaceutical innovation. Therefore, oncology APM initiatives are best constructed on 
an episode-of-care payment, avoiding the increase in the number of different payments through 
bundles. The literature also denotes that bundled payments place oncology practices in a position 
that assumes greater financial risk, which encourages practices to consolidate, often through 
vertical integration into larger health systems.  
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5.0 Oncology APM Limitations 
Inconsistent definitions of value are one of the more prominent weaknesses in APM 
development in the healthcare industry and this is particularly evident in oncology APMs. The 
problem of subjectivity in the value equation has multiple issues because it depends on the lens of 
the stakeholder, in addition to the outcomes themselves (Gupta, D., et. Al., 2016). For example, 
clinicians and patients may have definitions of value that pertain to the efficacy of treatment or the 
overall patient experience. Meanwhile, across the sector, payers and regulators may be viewing 
value as more metric driven (i.e. hospital readmission reduction rates, patient medication 
adherence rates, etc.). Even through the lens of metric driven outcomes for defining value, health 
systems have difficulty deciding on which outcomes to measure. This ties back to the current lack 
of standardized patient outcome definitions as they pertain to value. These macro-level issues in 
APM adoption persist in the oncology space as well (Gupta, D., et. Al., 2016). Further research 
has indicated that APM implementation in the medical oncology space has introduced the 
unintended consequences of under-treatment. This is intuitive, as providers can anticipate financial 
challenges when taking on potentially high-risk patients in a value – based environment (Ems, D., 
et. Al., 2018). While episode-based care has indicated positive results in reducing cancer service 
expenditures, the challenges in constructing oncology APMs remain, predominately due to the 
complexity of treatment. The vast spectrum of different cancer types, facilities, and medical 
specialties add additional problems (Kline, R., et. Al., 2017). Further considerations regarding 
complexity of cancer care provide a deeper understanding of some of the underline challenges in 
oncology APM initiatives.  
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6.0 Recommendations to Health Systems 
Literature and industry report consistent limitations across APM adoption broadly and 
within oncology specifically. It is evident that successful APM implementation for cancer services 
require narrow scopes with clearly defined metrics, episodes-of-care, and patient populations for 
a given timeframe. The recommendation for payers and providers is to consider all of the elements 
across different APMs, along with the range of APMs applied to oncology in other health systems. 
Beginning with oncology, health systems must clearly define the patient population that can most 
reasonably be shifted from a FFS environment to VBP one. In order to zero in on a certain patient 
population, a specific type of cancer, along with the exact stage of cancer needs to be targeted. The 
next and potentially most complicated step is defining the episode-of-care because many cancer 
patients have comorbidities and distinct health conditions. The number of clinical treatment 
pathways promotes additional challenges in this step, as payers and providers must decide on 
narrowing the scope to chemotherapy, specific drug treatment, radiation, or surgery. Beyond this 
selection, there are multiple sub-specialty treatments that must be considered when defining the 
episode-of-care. For example, the typical patient undergoing chemotherapy likely has multiple 
comorbidities, medications, and other treatment modalities such as physical or occupational 
therapy. In addition to achieving definition alignment on the specific patient population and 
treatment pathway, payers and providers must also decide on the specifics in APM development. 
These components involve difficult decisions surrounding performance targets (absolute or 
relative), payment rewards for outcomes or improvement, and the establishment of bonuses or 
penalties. Further decisions must achieve alignment on whether quality and cost will be considered 
in the overall calculation of value, as numerous APMs have only considered one or the other, rather 
 30 
than both simultaneously. Following this decision, the ability to select appropriate clinical quality 
and cost metrics is paramount in successful APM adoption. With the specific cancer service 
definitions aligned and all APM construction decisions finalized, health systems still have barriers 
on the implementation front. The capabilities to monitor and report accurate clinical and cost data 
remains a potential problem, even in traditional payment environments. The overall 
recommendation to health systems when considering adoption of APMs for cancer services is to 
narrow the scope on both the clinical and payment side, in order to mitigate innumerable 
administrative problems due to cancer complexity.   
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7.0 Conclusion 
With the understanding that oncology treatment is incredibly individualized, developers of 
payment models must account for the necessary level of detail and complexity when determining 
value in cancer care delivery. There are many issues related to the adoption of APMs that have 
impacts on shifting to VBP in oncology. The overarching critique of the models are their inability 
to indicate an improvement in value, patient outcomes and reduce costs. Further, there are unique 
challenges in cancer care that present further complications in APM adoption and implementation 
across this medical domain. These are related to the fact that oncology is a collection of diseases, 
rather than an individual condition. Moreover, cancer diagnosis and treatment are incredibly 
intricate and not well defined, which leads to potential issues in provider billing and 
reimbursement. Despite these limitations and uncertainties, it’s evident that the increase in APMs 
across the payer and provider sectors will increase moving forward and health systems will need 
to embrace for the clinical, data and regulatory challenges in the future state. This is critically 
important for payers and providers to understand and prepare for the adoption of APMs, as CMS 
and the HCPLAN continue to regulate and monitor the shift to VBP, across more domains of 
medicine.  
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Appendix HCPLAN Results 
Table 3. HCPLAN Results 
HCPLAN 2018 APM Results 
Line of Business 
Category 
1 
Category 
2 
Category 
3 
Category 
4 
Categories 3 & 4 Combined 
Medicare 
Advantage 
40% 7% 36% 17% 54% 
Traditional 
Medicare 
10% 49% 37% 4% 41% 
Medicaid 66% 11% 17% 6% 23% 
Commercial 56% 14% 28% 3% 30% 
Total Payments 39% 25% 31% 5% 36% 
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